B eginning wi th von K c uma nn, m at hcm >lticians con cc rn cd with ti le rati ollal tl ilalr s i,; of conflict sit uations ha ve reali zcd t hat inycstigation of acc ura tc o r simplifi ed \'cn; io ns of co mmon card games lead s to techniques a nd insigh t s applicablc to sit uations of mili ta n ' or economic intcrest .. . I n the p rese n t p aper, a symm e tric pokc r m odel onc s tagc morc co nl plicated t ha n t he o:'lgll1aI von Ne uma n n gamc is soh ·cd . T hcre a rc l wo bct lc \'cls, a, b, a nd a n ante of ~ umt (t;t > b> 1).; no ra lscs arc perml ttcd . Thc g'l mc ha s a uni q uc op t ima l stra tegy, whJCh forbids bluffing on a low ha nd . The limi t in g rasc b= I is s l10w n to vicld the von Ne uma nn mode l. 
Introduction
Th e Leclll1icalli Le raLure of the' J1 wL bematieal theory of games of sLraLegy can be roughly subdivided in Lo (i) general paper s, which deal wi Lh concep ts, exisLenee Lheorems and compuLa Lional me LllOds r elevan t for broa,d classes of games, and (ii) specific p aper s, in which lhe solu Lions of parLicular gll mes are deLermined . Al t houg h many of Lhe st udies in Lhe second category have dealt with problems suggested by economic or military conflicts, e.g. [1 , 2] 2, a subsLanLial fracLion have deal t wi th accm ate or simplifiecl versions of common eard ga mes, the b est known example being von Ne umann's analysis of a simple poker model ([3] , sec. 19.4 to 19.10) . Bridge and baccarat ha ve been Lrea ted [4, 5] , b ut poke r has remained t he favo riLe Lopic for Lhese st udies [3 , 6 to 10] , perhaps because the poker models invesLigated have presenLed just t he righ t degr ee of challenge ("no t easy, but noL impossibly hard") to Lh e ingenui ty of the analyst. Of course Lhe techniq lles and insights developed in these investigations arc then applicable Lo situa t ion s of greater practical importance.
The presen t p aper deals wiLh a symmeLric poker game one stage more complicated than von Neumann's original model. The game is continuous in Lhe sense that the difficulties [6] due to the enormous but finite number of possible hands have b een avoided by assuming (as von N oumann did ) an infinite continuum of possible hands. The (more difficult) asymmetric version has also b een solved by the authors; the results will appear elsewh ere [11] .
. Description of the Game
The rules of the game are as follows. The two players Rand S first an te 1 unit. They t hen r eceive independen t random numbers (han ds) from the interval [0, 1] . Each player knows his own hand, but no t that of his opponent. The players act simultaneously, each ei ther dropping, be t ting an additioUllI 
It is convenient to define , for any r(z) ,
For any r( z) , Gi(z) will denote the expected payoff to player R , using r(z), against a fixed hand z and a fixed course of action i of his opponent. Thus the expected payoff ftmction of the game is given by
The explicit formulas 8 for the Gi(z ) are readily found from figures 1 and 2:
R has the higher hand. S has the higher h and.
G1 (Z)
= l " [1'z(t) + 1'3 (t) + 1'4( t) ]elt + i 1h(t) + 1'3(t) + 1'4(t)]dt, (2.2)
G2 (z)= l " [-1'I(t) -b1'2(t) -b1'3(t) + br4(t)]dt + i l [-l\(t) + b1'2(t ) + br3(t ) + b1'4(t )]elt, (2.3)
G3 (z) = 1Z [-1'1 (t) -br2(t) -br3(tl -ar4(t) ]elt + i l [-rl(t) + br2(t)+ br3(t) + a1'4(t)]dt, (2.4) G4 ( z) = l ' [-1'1 (t) -b1'2
(t ) -ar3(t) -a1'4(t) ]dt + i l [-1'I(t) -b1'2(t)+ w'3( t) + a1'4(t )]dt. (2.5)
8 Note that tile G,(z) ' s arc shown hy these.formnlas to be continuous fnnctions.
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. Plan of Attack
It would not be very instructive simply to state the solution of the game and demonstrate its correctness. Instead, a slightly polished version of the process actually used to solve the game will be pl'e-! sented. This is done in sec tions 4 and 5, in which : it is proved (subject to tbe plausible assumntion stated in sec. 4) that the only possible optimal strategy is the one obeying the conditions (a) to (el ) of lemma 8, which deal with the b ehavior of the strategyon three intervals [O,g ) , (g,g'), and (g' ,I ] which might be thought of as the sets of low hands, interm ediate hands, and high hands. It is then relatively easy to verify that this particular strategy is indeed the unique optimal strategy; this is done in section 6, primarily by inspection of the expected payoff function (2.1). In section 7 the limi ting case b = 1 is dealt with, and this game is found to have a unique optimal strategy obtained 9 by "passing to the limit " in the optimal strategy for b> 1. The von Neumann poker game of sec tions 19.4 to 19.10 of [3] is sllOwn to arise as a "reduced game" from this limiting case.
In section 4 it is shown that r3(z) = 0 on [0,1] for every optimal r(z). The points g, g' are located, and I the unique optimal r(z) is isolated in section 5. The arguments of these sections are essentially all applications of the following dominati on criterion:
Th e stmtegy r(z) is optimal only if the jollowing is tl'ue: For each z, i jor which Gi(z) (as a. junction oj i ) does not assume its minimum, 1'i(Z) = O.
The correctness of this criterion follows from the smoothness condition (ii) and the fact that 1'(z) is optimal only if
Elimina hon of One Cou rse of Action
The elimination is effected as follows .
Otherwise, for some optimal 1'(z) , B z'> 0 and r3(z» ° for some z> 0. If z' is the least upper bound of the set of all such z, then by (2.4) and (2.5) so that by continuity and the domination criterion
The following plausible assumption (which will be verified in sec. 6) is now made:
ASSUMP'l' ION: For every optimal 1'(z) , 1'4(1»0 (anel thus R4> 1).
Derivation of the Necessary Conditions
'in co app licaLion of t lte domination crilerion req lIires cxam inin g li tO signs of LllC pairwisc clifYcr-('n('cs of LIl(' Oi(Z) " , t he formulas for t hcse difr('f"cJl("cS ( based o n (2 .2) Lo (2.5) and tlte eo nditi o n /'3(2) = 0 on [0, 11) wi ll firs t be g iven :
The firsL Jo ur of Llll'se con Linu ous fu n diOJl s nrl' d ead y monoton e nonulcrea ing. The fo llowi ng table 10 defines the maximal open inle rvals in which these funcLion s are pos iLiv e (+), zero (0), a n d n egative (-). For each in terval in lhe (+) and (-) columns, the resu l L of apply ing lhe dominalion criterion is given . Insp ecLion of (5. 1) lo (5 .4) reveals condiLion s on Lhe intcrYHls in lh e (0) column !O Of course lemma 1 renclers su perflu ous tile "ppearanee of '3( Z) =0 in tbe table.
Difforence (+ )
wllich are g iH'1l belo\\' the intt'l·val. A ques tion mflL"k m ca ns thaL thc in Lcl'\" al may (so far ns is known aL the momcn t) b c vac uo us or dcgene rat e to a s in gle poinL ; t ltc co ndition IV]"illcn belo \\" s uch an intc r nll is to npply only if Lhe inLerval is 11 0 11 -dcgcneraLc.
Th e llcxL t hree lClllmn s y ie ld Lli (' valu cs o f HI, H2 nndR. foroptin11l1 1'(z) (lrmm }[ 1 s bol\"s thnt R3= 0).
G4 (0) 
and (a) is proved. If (b) were false, then by (b ) of lemma 2, the monotonicity of G4(Z)-G1(z), and the domina tion cri terion, we wo uld h ave R 1 = 0, contradicting (a).
Ll~MMA 4. Fol' every oplimall'(z) :
R2=(a -b)lb(a I b). R 4= 2/ (a + b).
This follows from lemma :) /lml tllC corolla)'), R1+ R2 + R4= 1 of lemma 1.
N rxt the points g, U' will be lo cated, and the behavior of an optimal 1'(z) on [O ,g) , (g,g' ) and
on (U, I ].
B y (5 .5) and lemma 4, continuity and the domination criterion show that 1'4(Z)= 0 in a neighborhood of g4f, but (5.4) and (b ) of lemma 3 show that th is contradicts the definition of g~. An entirely s imil, ar ar~umen t refu tes the possibility q4f<g2f" and so g2f, = g~. B y (5. 7) and (5.10) we have 1',(z)= 1 on [0, g2f,) and1'l( z)= O on (g2f" J], so tlmL g2). = H,; an appli ca,tion of (a) of lemma 4 com pl r t es the proof. 
L E VU]\ G. For aery optimal l'(z):
(a) g3J,= p' =(a -1)/a. (b ) 1'4(Z) = 1 on (g', 1] . Note first that 1'4 (Z) = 1 ou (g3J" 1] si llce (i) r2( Z) = 0 on (g3J" 1] by (5 .9) , (ii) 1',(z)= O on (g,
7'2(z)= a/(a + b) on (g,g' ).
(c) r4
From lemma 1, lemma 5, and lemma 6 O llP ha s (>I ), (cl ), and also on (g,g').
(5.1:)) FI'OIll lrmlllH i , (5.5), and Ir l1unn 4 0 11(' hn:-;
011
(g.y '), ",bieh by smooLhn ess condiLion (1'ii) (ser sret iOIl 2) implies ' on (g,g') ;
Lhi s fi nd (5.] 3) iJllPl~' (b ) fmd (c) .
6 . Proof Tha t the Condition s Are Necessary a n d Sufficient for O p timality
In lhis secLion the noLation 1' (z) is ]"cselTed for Lhe pal'Lieular sLraLeg~' described in lemmn R, \\"hil e nrbilrary s tritlegies nrc dell oted /' *(z). [((r,I'*) if alld on/y 1 :1
011 ((I ,fI ') .
\\'hich (sillcc the gamc is symmeLrie) implics LllfiL 1'(.:) is optimH I. T hus any op timftl r t(z) mll s t s ilti sf~'
and thus, by lemma 1 llllcl (c) of lemnw 9, musL saLisfy r! (J )= 1. H ence Lhe ltSS umpti.on at the rnd of section 4 is corr ecL, and so, b~' Ir mm fi 8, r (:::) IS the mJ l y opt imn l s tl'H C og?
7, Discussion of a Limiting Case Th e l imiLing cnse b= ] \\"illIIO\\' be bridly discli Rbed . (R ecn II thaL b> t prcviollsl)' ,) I L is ras il~" vC l'i fi rd LhaL th e l'rs ults of Lhe previous sec Lions r rmnin valid (m a ll)" of Lhe proofs C1Ui br considerably simplifi ed ), so L11l1L thr game \\'ith b= 1 ]Ias a unique optimal s tmLeg)T which is obLa in eci from LhaL 1'0 1' b> l (i.c. , from (a) to (d ) of jemmil 8) by seLlillg b= 1. S ill ce g-O for b-I , the IIniq ll(' optimil l s lrntrgy isgi\'(,l1 b~"
The K (r ,r *) or (2.1 ) is firs t \\'I'i t tC' l1 ;IS (hl' S tllll or Lhrsr int C'grals :
L' pon Cil ll llgi ll g 
